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Abstract
We analyze a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental
damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting ﬁrm.
We compare environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated upon
learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When
investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty,
neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an eﬃcient solution.
When there is little uncertainty, rules are superior to discretion because discretionary
policy gives the ﬁrm an incentive to distort investment in order to inﬂuence future reg-
ulation. However, when uncertainty is large, discretion is superior to rules because it
allows regulation to incorporate new information. Under discretionary policy, taxes are
superior to standards regardless of the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal
damages.
JEL Code: H23, Q2.
Key words: environmental regulation, emissions taxes and standards, rules versus dis-
cretion, technology adoption and innovation.
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Virtually without exception, decisions about environmental policy are made without com-
plete information about either the beneﬁts or the costs of environmental improvement. Set-
ting environmental policy under uncertainty in a static setting has been the subject of a
fairly large literature in economics beginning with Weitzman (1974). (See Lewis 1996 for
an excellent summary.) Setting environmental policy, however, is not a static proposition.
Results of new scientiﬁc studies can lead to updated beliefs on how much damage is caused
by emissions. New technologies or investment in new plant and equipment may make pol-
lution abatement easier and cheaper to accomplish. Such new information should lead a
welfare-maximizing regulator to adjust environmental policy. In fact, environmental regula-
tions are periodically adjusted based on updated understanding or new circumstances. For
example, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone and particulate matter were
tightened in 1997. EPA stated that “... many important new studies have been published
which show that breathing particulate matter at concentrations allowed by the current pri-
mary standard can likely cause signiﬁcant health eﬀects —including premature death and an
increase in respiratory illness.”1 More recently, the standards on arsenic in drinking water
were lowered from 50 parts per billion to 10 parts per billion. Yet knowing that regulations
may be adjusted may give regulated ﬁrms scope to adjust their behavior in order to try to
inﬂuence future regulation.
In this paper, we analyze environment regulation with learning about environmental
damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting ﬁrm. We
model the order of moves in a game between the regulator and the ﬁrm based on the ease or
speed with which a variable or decision can change. We assume that the most diﬃcult deci-
sion to change in a short period of time is the form of the regulatory regime. The regulatory
1Cited from http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/ozpmbro/partmat.htm.
1regime is typically based on environmental statutes or administrative procedures that require
concerted eﬀort to change. In our model, the regulatory regime determines whether regula-
tion occurs via emissions taxes or emissions standards. The regulatory regime also speciﬁes
whether regulation is ﬁxed (rules), or may change based on new information (discretion).
Given the regulatory regime, the ﬁrm chooses investment in technology where greater invest-
ment results in lower (expected) abatement costs. After the investment decision, uncertainty
about abatement costs and environmental damages is resolved. With discretion, the partic-
ular level of the tax or standard is then chosen. However, under rules, regulation is ﬁxed in
the ﬁrst stage. Finally the ﬁrm chooses its abatement level and payoﬀs are realized.
We consider two variants of the model: one with technology adoption and the other
with technology innovation by a polluting ﬁrm. In section 2, we analyze an adoption model
in which the ﬁrm chooses a technology from a menu of available existing technologies. Larger
investment leads to lower abatement costs with certainty. In section 3, the ﬁrm chooses its
expenditure on research and development for technology innovation where greater investment
results in a larger probability of ﬁnding a new technology with lower abatement costs. The
major diﬀerence between the innovation model and the adoption model is the stochastic
response of cost to investment.
The main question we investigate in this paper is whether it is better for a regulator
to commit to an emissions policy prior to learning about environmental damages and tech-
nology choice by ﬁrms (rules), or whether it is better to adjust policy after learning about
environmental damages and technology choice (discretion). In both variants (adoption and
innovation), we show that the regulator cannot achieve the ﬁrst-best solution with taxes or
standards under either rules or discretion. Rules are not ﬁrst best because regulation may
not reﬂect actual beneﬁts or costs of abatement after technology choice and uncertainty is
resolved. As in Kydland and Prescott (1977), discretion is not ﬁrst best because of the
strategic nature of the game. The investment decision of the ﬁrm will be distorted in order
2to inﬂuence regulation. Ideally, a regulator would like to make regulation conditional on the
resolution of uncertainty but not have regulation conditional on investment. This outcome
is not possible because investment occurs prior to resolution of uncertainty.
We also analyze whether taxes or standards are preferable. With rules, taxes and
standards yield exactly the same solution. The regulator sets regulation such that expected
marginal beneﬁts of abatement equal expected marginal cost (post investment). This can be
accomplished with either taxes or standards. On the other hand, with a discretionary policy,
taxes and standards yield diﬀerent outcomes. Under an emissions standard, discretionary
policy results in a lower incentive to invest because lower marginal emissions costs cause the
regulator to tighten the standard. Under an emissions tax, discretionary policy increases the
incentive to invest because lower marginal emissions costs cause the regulator to set a lower
tax rate (Kennedy and Laplante 1999, Karp and Zhang 2001, Moledina et al. 2003). In
section 4, we compare expected social costs (abatement costs plus pollution damages) under
rules, discretionary taxes and discretionary standards. When uncertainty about damages is
relatively small, rules are preferred to discretion because avoiding distortion of investment
incentives is more important than adjusting policy in light of new information. On the
other hand, with relatively large uncertainty about damages, discretion is preferred to rules.
Under discretion, we ﬁnd that taxes are preferred to standards for a model with quadratic
costs and beneﬁts regardless of the slopes of marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt. This result
contrasts with Weitzman (1974) where taxes are preferred to standards if and only if the
absolute value of the slope of marginal beneﬁts is smaller than the absolute value of the
slope of marginal cost.
These results have direct implications for the policy debate on the eﬀectiveness of
technology forcing standards. Technology forcing standards are set at levels that cannot be
met by the regulated ﬁrms with current technology. The idea behind setting strict standards
is to stimulate research and development and force technological innovation. Technology
3forcing standards have been used in North America and Europe to regulate emissions of air
pollutants. For example, the U.S. Clean Air Act required a 90 percent reduction in emissions
when there were few means available to achieve the emissions reduction goal (Leone 1998).
Our results show that committing to standards (rules) when there is large uncertainty about
costs can lead to large expected losses. In such cases, discretionary policy is preferable, and
with discretion, taxes are preferred to standards (at least for quadratic costs and beneﬁts).
There is a growing literature on dynamic environmental regulation, much of it inspired
by interest in climate change policy. Kolstad (1996) characterized optimal regulation with
learning about damages for a stock pollutant. Learning can delay the timing of irreversible
investment in abatement technology. Other papers that analyze learning and irreversible
investment in dynamic environmental contexts include Ulph and Ulph (1997), Kelly and
Kolstad (1999), Pindyck (2000) and Saphores (2002). These papers characterize optimal
regulation; they do not consider the strategic aspects of the game between the regulator
and the ﬁrm. Several other papers consider the problem of asymmetric information about
abatement cost in a dynamic setting (Benford 1998, Hoel and Karp 2001, Karp and Zhang
2001, 2002, Moledina et al. 2003, Newell and Pizer 1998). Of these papers, the three most
similar to ours are Karp and Zhang (2001, 2002) and Moledina et al. (2003). The two
papers by Karp and Zhang (2001, 2002) analyze a model with stock pollution and non-
strategic ﬁrms. Karp and Zhang (2001) analyze a model with investment while Karp and
Zhang (2002) analyze a model with learning about damages. In the model with learning,
they ﬁnd that the relative eﬃciency of taxes over standards increases as the regulator has
more opportunities for learning. Moledina et al. (2003) analyze a model with strategic ﬁrms
that adjust their behavior to alter future regulation, but assume a na¨ ıve regulator. None of
these papers analyze a game in which both regulators and regulated ﬁrm(s) are strategic.
The other strand of relevant literature analyzes technological change and environmen-
tal regulation (see Jaﬀe et al. for a recent survey). Much of this literature analyzes incentives
4to adopt new technology when regulation is ﬁxed, as in our model with rules, and there is
no uncertainty (see, for example, Milliman and Prince 1989). In a paper closer in spirit to
our paper, Kennedy and Laplante (1999) analyze a model in which regulation changes in
response to technology adoption decisions of ﬁrms. They consider a case with strategic ﬁrms
and show that ﬁrms over-invest when regulated via taxes and under-invest when regulated
via tradable emissions permits. Unlike our model, there is no uncertainty about either dam-
ages or costs, and they only consider discretionary policy rather than compare rules versus
discretion.
In Section 2, we describe a game with endogenous technology adoption. We deﬁne
the alternative policy schemes that we consider—rules and discretion—and deﬁne the corre-
sponding subgame perfect equilibria. Then we characterize the welfare consequence of each
scheme when the policy instrument consists of emissions taxes and emissions standards. Sec-
tion 3 introduces an alternative model with endogenous technology innovation. Section 4
compares the expected total cost under rules and discretion for taxes and standards using
numerical simulations. We analyze both the adoption model and the innovation model in
the simulations. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and comments on potential future
research.
2 A model with technology adoption
2.1 Model Environment
This subsection describes a game-theoretic model of pollution regulation with endogenous
technology adoption involving a regulator and a single polluting ﬁrm. At the outset of
the game, the regulator chooses the policy scheme to be employed. We consider two types
of policy schemes: 1) discretion, in which the regulator may update policy based on new
conditions or information, and 2) rules, in which policy chosen at the outset is ﬁxed and
5cannot be updated. For each scheme we consider two alternative policy instruments: simple
(linear) emissions taxes and emissions standards.
In the next stage of the game, the ﬁrm chooses investment in adoption of emissions
abatement capital. Let e represent the level of emissions by the ﬁrm and let k represent
investment. Let r represent the unit cost of investment. The ﬁrm’s emissions abatement
cost is given by C(e,k). We assume that the emissions abatement cost function is decreasing
in emissions and abatement investment (Ce < 0, Ck < 0), convex (Cee > 0,Ckk > 0,CeeCkk−
C2
ek ≥ 0) and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. We also assume that marginal abatement
cost, −Ce, is decreasing in investment, Cek > 0.2
Emissions of pollution by the ﬁrm cause damages, which are external to the ﬁrm.
Initially there is uncertainty about the damage function. Let S represent the set of possible
states and let D(e;s) represent damages caused by emissions in state s ∈ S. Let π(s) be the
probability that state s occurs. Uncertainty about which state will occur is resolved after
the ﬁrm has chosen investment. We assume De(·;s) > 0,Dee(·;s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. We also
assume that De(e;s) > De(e;s0) for all e ≥ 0 for some states s,s0 ∈ S with π(s),π(s0) > 0.
After uncertainty about damages is resolved, the regulator sets the tax or standard
if they are in a discretionary policy regime (otherwise taxes and standards are ﬁxed and
cannot be changed). The ﬁrm then chooses emissions. Finally payoﬀs to the ﬁrm and the








π(s)[C(e(s),k) + τ(s)e(s)] under taxes
where τ(s) is the per unit tax on emissions in state s. (Under rules, the tax rate τ is the
same across the states.) The regulator is assumed to care about minimizing the total cost
2Ci is the ﬁrst-order partial derivative of C with respect to i(∈ {e,k}). Cij is the second-order derivative
of C with respect to i,j(∈ {e,k}).





The complete order of moves of the games is summarized in ﬁgure 1. In ﬁgure 1a, we
show the sequence of moves for the discretionary policy game. Figure 1b shows the sequence
of moves for the rules game. The diﬀerence between discretion and rules is that the tax or
standard is selected in the initial move in the rules game, but is chosen after investment and
uncertainty is resolved in the discretionary game.
2.2 Emissions taxes
2.2.1 Equilibrium of the tax subgame under rules
Given a tax τ on emissions, the ﬁrm solves
min
e,k≥0
rk + C(e,k) + τe.
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an interior solution are
r + Ck(e,k) = 0,
Ce(e,k) + τ = 0.






A subgame perfect equilibrium of tax subgame under rules is given by a strategy
proﬁle (τRT,(kRT(τ),(eRT(τ))τ≥0)) that solves the above optimization problems by the ﬁrm
and the regulator. (Superscript RT denotes the rules tax scheme.)
72.2.2 Equilibrium of the discretionary-tax subgame
With discretionary taxes, the regulator chooses a state- and investment-dependent tax plan.
Given investment k ≥ 0, state s ∈ S and tax τ, the ﬁrm chooses the level of emissions to
solve
min
e≥0 C(e,k) + τe
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution is
Ce(e,k) + τ = 0.
Denote the solution by e(k,τ). Given the ﬁrm’s emissions plan (as functions of taxes and
investment) {e(k,τ)}s∈S, the regulator solves
min
τ≥0 C(e(k,τ),k) + D(e(k,τ);s)
for all s ∈ S given investment k. Denote the solution by {τ(k,s)}k≥0,s∈S.








A subgame perfect equilibrium of a discretionary-tax subgame is given by a strat-
egy proﬁle ({(τDT(k,s))k≥0}s∈S,(kDT,{(eDT(τ,s))τ≥0}s∈S)) that solves the above optimiza-
tion problems by the ﬁrm and the regulator.(Superscript DT denotes the discretionary tax
scheme.)
2.3 Welfare properties of emissions taxes
Now we compare the alternative policy schemes—discretion and rules—in terms of eﬃciency.
First we characterize the optimal (socially least cost) investment/emissions plan. Then we
examine whether taxes, under either rules or discretion, can achieve eﬃciency.







s.t. k ≥ 0 and e(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
Given the convexity of the functions, the following ﬁrst order conditions are necessary and










∗) = 0. (2)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the optimal solution is interior.
Proposition 1 states that the regulator can implement the optimal investment/emissions
plan if the regulator can choose taxes that are contingent only on the realized state.
Proposition 1 A state-contingent and investment-independent tax plan {τ(s)}s∈S achieves
the socially minimum cost if τ(s) ≡ De(e∗(s);s) for all s ∈ S where e∗(s) denotes the optimal
emissions in state s.
(See Appendix A for the proof.) A state-contingent, investment-independent tax scheme
allows taxes to be adjusted to reﬂect actual conditions allowing marginal abatement costs to
equal marginal damages. However, since taxes are not a function of investment, there is no
scope for the ﬁrm to manipulate the tax through its investment decision. The optimal policy
is not available to the regulator in the game because the ﬁrm chooses investment prior to the
realization of the state. Hence, if the regulator minimizes the total cost after resolution of
damage uncertainty, then the regulator needs to specify the tax rate depending on the ﬁrm’s
technology choice. Once the regulator makes the taxes state-dependent, a time-consistent
regulator cannot make the taxes investment-independent.
9We now show that the two policy schemes—discretion and rules—cannot achieve ef-
ﬁciency. As a ﬁrst step to prove that discretionary policy will be ineﬃcient, we use the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium discretionary tax rates are decreasing functions of k.
(See Appendix A for the proof.) The lemma shows that the regulator will choose a lower tax
rate if higher investment is observed, Therefore, the ﬁrm will have an incentive to invest in
order to manipulate the regulator into setting a lower tax. This is the source of ineﬃciency
in discretionary policies. Using this lemma, we show that discretionary tax policies lead to
suboptimal technology adoption and emissions choices. In addition, under the assumption
that the ﬁrm’s cost function, given how the regulator adjusts taxes, is convex in investment,
a discretionary tax scheme will result in over-investment relative to the optimal investment
(Proposition 2).
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the discretionary tax scheme does not achieve the eﬃcient
solution (socially minimum cost). Furthermore, if the ﬁrm’s objective function is convex
in investment given that taxes depend on investment, then the equilibrium investment in a
discretionary-tax subgame kDT is larger than the optimal investment k∗.
(See Appendix A for the proof.) The ﬁrm’s investment optimization problem under discre-
tionary tax policies, where the ﬁrm takes into account the eﬀect of its investment on the tax,
is not necessarily convex in investment even if the functions C and {D(·;s)}s∈S are convex.
As discussed in Appendix B, the convexity assumption holds if the functions C and D are
second-order polynomials of emissions and investment.
The following proposition states that a tax rule also fails to achieve the eﬃcient
solution as long as S is non-degenerate.
10Proposition 3 The equilibrium tax rate under rules does not achieve the socially minimum
cost.
(See Appendix A for the proof.)
2.4 Emissions standards
Here we describe the subgame perfect equilibria for the emissions-standard subgames. With
emissions standard q(s) ≥ 0 in state s, the ﬁrm is restricted to choose emissions e(s) so that
e(s) ≤ q(s). Alternatively, one could assume that e(s) can exceed q(s) but that this would
invoke a large ﬁne such that the ﬁrm would never ﬁnd it optimal to choose e(s) > q(s).
2.4.1 Equilibrium of the standard subgame under rules




s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ q.
Given the emissions abatement cost is decreasing in emissions, the ﬁrm will choose e = q.
Then the necessary conditions for an interior solution are
r + Ck(q,k) = 0,
e = q.






A subgame perfect equilibrium of a standard subgame under rules is given by a strat-
egy proﬁle (qRS,(kRS(q),eRS(q))q≥0) that solves the above optimization problems by the
regulator and the ﬁrm. (Superscript RS denotes the rules standard scheme.)
112.4.2 Equilibrium of the discretionary-standard subgame
Given investment k ≥ 0 and state s ∈ S, under standard q(k,s) the ﬁrm chooses the level
of emissions e(k,s) = q(k,s). Given the ﬁrm’s emissions plan, the regulator solves
min
q≥0 C(q,k) + D(q;s)
for all s ∈ S given investment k. Denote the solution by {q(k,s)}k≥0,s∈S.








A subgame perfect equilibrium of a discretionary-standard subgame is given by a
strategy proﬁle ({(qDS(k,s))k≥0}s∈S,(kDS,{(eDS(q,s))q≥0}s∈S)) that solves the above opti-
mization problems by the regulator and the ﬁrm. (Superscript DS denotes the discretionary
standard scheme.)
2.5 Welfare properties of emissions standards
Here we consider the welfare properties of emissions standards under discretion and rules.
Fact 1 A state-contingent standard scheme achieves the socially minimum cost if, for all
s ∈ S, the emissions standard q(s) in state s is equal to e∗(s), the optimal emissions in state
s.
Fact 1 immediately follows from the assumption that the abatement cost function C is
strictly decreasing in emissions (and hence the constraint on emissions induced by a standard
is binding). As in the proof for Proposition 1, given that the emissions level in each state is
optimal, the ﬁrm’s investment choice is equal to k∗, the optimal investment level.
12If the standard is contingent on both the state and the investment by the ﬁrm, then
the regulator cannot achieve eﬃciency. To show this, ﬁrst we prove that the regulator has
an incentive to strengthen the standard if a higher level of investment is observed (Lemma
2).
Lemma 2 The equilibrium discretionary emissions standards {q(s)}s∈S are decreasing func-
tions of k.
(See Appendix A for the proof.) The ﬁrm, therefore, has an incentive to reduce investment
to get a more lenient standard. This result leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium discretionary standards do not achieve the socially mini-
mum cost. Furthermore, if the ﬁrm’s objective function is convex in investment given that
standards depend on investment, then the equilibrium investment in a discretionary-standard
subgame kDS is smaller than the optimal investment k∗.
(See Appendix A for the proof.) It is worthwhile noting that discretionary taxes and dis-
cretionary standards are both suboptimal, but they are suboptimal in diﬀerent ways. The
discretionary emissions tax results in over-investment whereas the discretionary emissions
standard causes the ﬁrm to under-invest.
As with taxes, emissions standards under rules are suboptimal. When standards are
set prior to the resolution of uncertainty, the standard set may not achieve an eﬃcient result
given the realized damage function.
2.6 Comparison of Taxes versus Standards
Here we compare the relative eﬃciency of taxes versus standards under both rules and
discretion. We begin by comparing taxes and standards under rules.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium standard rules and equilibrium tax rules result in the same ex-
pected social cost in equilibrium.
13(See Appendix A for the proof.) Because the regulator has committed to a policy (tax
or standard), the ﬁrm faces no uncertainty when it makes its choice of investment and
emissions level. Therefore, the regulator can induce the ﬁrm to choose a given investment
and emissions choice via either a standard or a tax. The regulator will then choose policy
such that it attains minimum ex-ante expected social cost from the set of possible induced
investment and emissions responses of the ﬁrm. Note that this result is not optimal because
in fact the ﬁrm’s emissions choice should reﬂect the true state of damages.
Next, we compare the relative performance of taxes versus standards under discre-
tionary policy. Because investment levels diﬀer under taxes and standards, causing diﬀer-
ences in resulting regulatory policy and emissions, comparing performance is complicated. To
simplify the task, we restrict attention for the following proposition to a case with quadratic




c(¯ e − e − ak)
2 for e,k such that 0 ≤ e ≤ ¯ e − ak,k ≥ 0 (3)




+ f(s)e for e ≥ 0 (4)
where d > 0 and f(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, and the mean of f(s) is given by
P
s∈S π(s)f(s) = f
for some f > 0. These functions satisfy all of the properties assumed for cost and beneﬁt
functions. With this speciﬁcation, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under a discretionary policy regime and quadratic cost and beneﬁt functions
(given by equations 3 and 4), the expected total costs are lower in equilibrium with emissions
taxes compared to the expected total costs in equilibrium with emissions standards.
(See Appendix A for the proof). Proposition 6 states that emissions taxes are more eﬃcient
than emissions standards, at least under assumptions of quadratic costs and beneﬁts. This
14result contrasts with the results of Weitzman (1974) in which taxes are preferred to standards
if an only if the marginal beneﬁts curve is ﬂatter than the marginal cost curve. Proposition
6 holds regardless of the slopes of marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost. Under discretionary
policy, equilibrium results under standards and taxes would both be optimal conditional on
investment being set optimally. Ineﬃciency occurs because investment is distorted: over-
investment with taxes and under-investment with standards. The degree to which investment
is distorted away from the optimal level is greater under standards than under taxes, which
generates the result that taxes are preferred to standards.
One comparison that cannot be made unambiguously is the comparison between rules
and discretion. Whether rules are preferred to discretion, or vice-versa, depends upon the
degree of uncertainty about damages. We will illustrate this point and the magnitudes of
the ineﬃciency of various policy schemes with a numerical example in section 4.
3 A model with technology innovation
In this section, we modify the model of section 2 from one of adoption of existing technology
to one of innovation to discover new technology. The key modelling diﬀerence between inno-
vation and adoption is that the results of innovation are stochastic while those of adoption
are deterministic. We assume that greater investment results in a larger probability of ﬁnd-
ing a new technology with lower abatement costs. Otherwise, we retain the model structure
of section 2.
3.1 Model Environment
Denote the probability of innovation success by λ. Obtaining a higher probability of success
can be achieved through increased investment. Let G(λ) be the cost of innovation with
success probability λ. The function G is strictly increasing, convex and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable in success probability: G0(λ) > 0 and G00(λ) > 0 for λ ∈ [0,1). Further assume
15that the cost of innovation is zero when the success probability is zero and the cost tends to
inﬁnity as the success probability goes to one: G(0) = 0 and limλ→1 G(λ) = +∞. Because
G is monotonic, we can think of λ as representing the level of investment as well as the
probability of success.
If the ﬁrm is unsuccessful in innovating, then it retains the status-quo emissions re-
duction cost function C(e;H). (H stands for ‘high’ marginal abatement costs.) If the ﬁrm
is successful, then the cost function is C(e;L). (L stands for ‘low’ marginal abatement
costs.) We assume Ce(e;·) < 0,Cee(e;·) > 0 for all e ≥ 0 for both H and L. Further,
−Ce(e;H) > −Ce(e,L) for all e ≥ 0, i.e., marginal abatement costs are higher when innova-
tion is not successful








where e(s,L) (e(s,H)) is the amount of emissions in state s when innovation was successful
(failed).
3.2 Welfare properties of emissions taxes with technology innova-
tion











s.t. λ ∈ [0,1], e(s,H) ≥ 0 and e(s,L) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
Given the convexity of functions C and D, the following ﬁrst order conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient for an interior solution:
Ce(e
∗(s,L);L) + De(e
∗(s,L);s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, (5)
16Ce(e
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The next two propositions (6 and 7) show that emissions taxes under both discretion
and rules fail to achieve an eﬃcient outcome.
Proposition 7 Equilibrium discretionary taxes do not achieve the socially minimum cost.
Furthermore, the equilibrium success probability λDT is larger than the optimal level proba-
bility λ∗.
(See Appendix A for the proof.)
Proposition 8 The equilibrium tax rule does not achieve socially minimum cost.
Proposition 8 follows from the fact that the tax rule does not induce the ﬁrm to choose
diﬀerent emissions levels for diﬀerent realizations of states nor does the tax rate change for
diﬀerent results of innovation.
3.3 Welfare properties of emissions standards with technology in-
novation
If the standard is contingent on both the state and the investment by the ﬁrm, the regulator
cannot achieve eﬃciency because the ﬁrm’s innovation eﬀort is lower than optimal.
Proposition 9 The equilibrium discretionary standards do not achieve the socially mini-
mum cost. Furthermore, the equilibrium success probability λDS is lower than the optimal
probability λ∗.
17(See Appendix A for the proof.) As in the case with technology adoption, the standard
under rules and the taxes under rules do equally well in terms of eﬃciency (Proposition 10).
Proposition 10 Equilibrium standard rules and equilibrium tax rules result in the same
expected social cost in equilibrium.
The proof is similar to the proof for Proposition 5 and 3.
In sum, the results of the innovation model are qualitatively similar to the results in
the adoption model of section 2. Under rules, taxes and standards yield the same result. This
result is ineﬃcient because it does not reﬂect actual conditions of damages. Under discretion,
taxes result in over-investment while standards result in under-investment. Hence, discre-
tionary emissions taxes result in over-investment whereas discretionary emissions standards
causes the ﬁrm to under-invest in technology innovation.
4 Numerical Examples
In the previous two sections we showed that neither discretion or rules, taxes or standards,
achieves an eﬃcient result. In this section we use numerical simulation to investigate the
relative eﬃciency of these alternative regulatory schemes. Since taxes and standards yield
the same outcome under rules, we compare rules with discretionary taxes and discretionary
standards. We begin by analyzing the adoption model (4.1) and then analyze the innovation
model (4.2).
4.1 Simulation with technology adoption
In what follows we use simple quadratic cost and damage functions to illustrate the relative
eﬃciency of rules versus discretionary taxes versus discretionary standards. The emissions
abatement cost function and the damage function are given by equations (3) and (4) in-
troduced in subsection 2.6. For the random variable f(s), we assume P(f(s) = f + ε) =
18P(f(s) = f − ε) = 1
2 for some ε > 0. These functions satisfy the properties assumed in sec-
tion 2. With this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrm’s objective function is concave under discretionary
schemes. Parameters c, ¯ e,a,d,f,ε and the unit price of investment r are chosen so that all
the equilibrium solutions are interior. Hence, Propositions 1- 6 apply to this example.
In ﬁgure 2 we show the eﬀect of increased uncertainty on the relative eﬃciency of
alternative policy schemes. With no uncertainty (ε = 0), rules result in an eﬃcient solution.
The regulator can set standards or taxes to induce the ﬁrm to choose the correct levels
of investment and emissions. Discretionary policy, however, does not result in an eﬃcient
solution even with no uncertainty. This result occurs because of the distortion in investment
incentives. With increasing uncertainty, rules become relatively less eﬃcient. Rules may be
set in ways that are far from optimal given actual conditions. Ineﬃciency of rules increases
in a quadratic fashion with increases in ε. On the other hand, the relative ineﬃciency of
discretionary policy is hardly aﬀected by increased uncertainty because policy will be set
to reﬂect actual conditions. Ineﬃciency arises because of distortion of investment, which
is aﬀected little by changes in uncertainty. As shown in ﬁgure 2, discretionary policy is
preferred to rules for high levels of uncertainty.
As shown in ﬁgure 2, discretionary taxes are more eﬃcient than standards for the
complete range of uncertainty (see Proposition 6). Note that, in Weitzman (1974), taxes are
preferred to standards if and only if the marginal beneﬁts curve is ﬂatter than the marginal
cost curve. In ﬁgures 3 and 4 we show the eﬀect of changes in the slopes of marginal damages
and marginal abatement cost on the relative superiority of discretionary taxes compared to
standards. In ﬁgure 3, we ﬁx the slope of marginal damages equal to 1 and vary the slope
of the marginal abatement cost function (parameter c). As shown in ﬁgure 3, taxes become
increasingly favorable as c increases. In ﬁgure 4, we ﬁx the slope of the marginal abatement
cost equal to 1 and vary the slope of marginal damages (parameter d). Taxes become
increasingly superior to standards as d decreases. The advantage of taxes over standards
19under discretionary policy increases as the marginal beneﬁts curve becomes ﬂatter compared
to the marginal cost curve, consistent with Weitzman (1974). However, in our model with
quadratic costs and beneﬁt functions, taxes are superior to standards regardless of the slopes
of the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt functions.
In ﬁgure 5, we show the eﬀect of varying the cost of investment (parameter r). As the
cost of investment becomes larger, the ratio of deadweight loss to the ﬁrst-best level of cost
under each scheme becomes larger.
4.2 Simulation with technology innovation
For the innovation cost function G, assume G(λ) = A( 1
1−λ − 1 − λ) where A is a positive
constant. We assume the abatement cost function C is given by
C(e,H) =
c(¯ eH − e)2
2
for 0 ≤ e ≤ ¯ eH, C(e,L) =
c(¯ eL − e)2
2
for 0 ≤ e ≤ ¯ eL
where ¯ eL = α¯ eH with 0 < α < 1. (The smaller α, the larger improvement in abatement
technology when innovation is successful.) The damage function is identical with that given
in section 4.1. Parameters A,c, ¯ eH, ¯ eL,d,f and ε are positive and chosen so that all the
equilibrium solutions are interior. These functions satisfy the properties assumed in section
3 and hence Propositions 7 - 10 apply to this example.
In ﬁgure 6, we show results for a case where there is little diﬀerence in costs with
and without successful innovation. When the diﬀerence between the two abatement cost
functions, C(·,H) and C(·,L), is small (α = 0.95), there is little uncertainty about abatement
costs, making this model quite similar to the adoption model. In fact, we observe much the
same pattern in the rankings between rules, discretionary taxes and discretionary standards
as shown in ﬁgure 2 with the adoption model. When uncertainty about damages is low, rules
are preferable to discretion. With high uncertainty about damages, discretion is preferable
to rules.
20In ﬁgure 7 we show results for a case where there is a substantial cost reduction (50
percent, or α = 0.5) with successful innovation. In this case, discretionary policy is preferable
to rules even when there is little to no uncertainty about damages. In cases where there is
great uncertainty about the state of future technology, there is large risk in committing to
technology forcing standards. If it turns out that innovation is unsuccessful, the emissions
standard will be far more stringent ex post than conditions warrant. On the other hand, if
innovation is successful, then standards should be tightened further. Even factoring in the
distortion to innovation incentives, discretionary policies yield far lower expected costs than
do rule when there is large uncertainty about the state of future technology.
5 Discussion
In this paper we compared environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated
upon learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When
investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty, neither
discretion nor rules with either linear taxes or standards achieve an eﬃcient solution. When
uncertainty about damages or the results of investment are small, rules are superior discre-
tion, because discretionary policy schemes give the ﬁrm an incentive to distort investment in
order to inﬂuence future regulation. However, when uncertainty about either damages or the
results of investment is large, discretion is superior to rules because it allows regulation to
incorporate new information. We found that with discretionary policy, taxes are superior to
standards even in cases where marginal costs are ﬂatter than marginal damages, in contrast
to Weitzman (1974).
The ineﬃciency of environmental policy under both rules and discretion is caused by
the fact that investment occurs prior to the resolution of uncertainty. If it were possible
to reverse the order so that all uncertainty were resolved prior to investment, the regulator
21could make policy dependent on actual conditions but not dependent upon investment. This
would avoid distorting investment incentives while still allowing regulation to reﬂect actual
conditions. That this order cannot be reversed is clearest in the innovation model where
investment in R&D must take place prior to realizing the results of such activity. Even
with adoption, investments tend to be long-lived while new information is learned on a fairly
frequent basis.
Even with timing ﬁxed as in this model, the ineﬃciency of environmental policy with
learning and innovation under both rules and discretion could be overcome with suﬃciently
sophisticated regulatory policy. One way to achieve an eﬃcient result is for the regulator to
set non-linear taxes. An eﬃcient result will occur if the regulator sets a tax schedule equal to
realized marginal damages. In this case, the ﬁrm always faces the social costs of its actions
and it will choose eﬃcient levels of emissions abatement and investment. By deﬁnition, fully
internalizing all external costs will correct externalities, but such solutions cannot typically
be implemented in practice.
Another possible route to overcome ineﬃciency in cases with learning and innovation
is to consider the introduction of an environmental investment policy in addition to tra-
ditional environmental policy targeted to emissions. Innovation policies would need to be
coordinated with emissions policy. Under discretionary emissions standards, the ﬁrm will
tend to investment too little. This distortion could be corrected by subsidizing investment
in emissions abatement equipment. On the other hand, under discretionary emissions taxes,
the ﬁrm will tend to invest too much. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, with a discre-
tionary emission tax scheme, investment in emissions abatement equipment should also be
taxed.
We assumed there is only one polluting ﬁrm in our model to highlight the strategic
aspects of the regulator-regulated ﬁrm interaction. At the other extreme, a large number of
small ﬁrms might each believe that their own actions have no inﬂuence on future regulation.
22In this case, there would be no distortion of investment incentives and discretionary policy
would be the optimal approach. In the more interesting intermediate case with a small
number of strategic ﬁrms, each ﬁrm must consider the eﬀect of their investment on rival
ﬁrms as well as on the regulator opening up numerous possible results. In addition, having
more than one ﬁrm raises the issue of appropriability of rents from successful innovation
among ﬁrms (see Fischer et al. 2003 for analysis of this issue).
In this model we focused on symmetric uncertainty about damages in the adoption
model and symmetric uncertainty about the result of R&D in the innovation model. An
alternative formulation of the innovation model would be to assume that the results of
innovation are private information to the ﬁrm, which would then make the model one of
regulation under asymmetric information. In addition to ﬁrms’ private information about
costs, the regulator’s type may be another source of asymmetric information. For example,
perhaps the commitment to rules is somewhat less than categorical. The ﬁrm may be
uncertain whether a regulator really can or cannot commit to rules. The ﬁrm will form a
belief on the regulator’s type (the ability of the regulator to commit rules) and the ﬁrm’s
response will depend on such beliefs. We leave analysis of asymmetric information models
to future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1








s.t. k ≥ 0, e(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
The optimal plan (k∗,{e∗(s)}s∈S) is characterized in the text by equations (1) and (2). On





for all s ∈ S. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions are
Ce(e(s),k) + τ(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.












With τ(s) ≡ De(e∗(k,s);s) for all s ∈ S, the equilibrium emissions and investment are the
same as the unique optimal solution.
24Proof of Lemma 1
Denote the optimal emissions given investment k and state s ∈ S by e∗(k,s). The optimal











The equilibrium tax rate τ(k,s) given investment k and state s ∈ S must satisfy
τ(k,s) = De(e
∗(k,s);s).








for all k ≥ 0 since D(·;s) is strictly convex in emissions. Hence, the equilibrium discretionary
tax rate is strictly decreasing in investment k.
Proof of Proposition 2
Given investment k, a realized state s ∈ S and a tax τ, the ﬁrm chooses emissions to solve
min
e≥0 C(e,k) + τe.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution is
Ce(e,k) + τ = 0. (8)
Let e(k,τ) represent the emissions level that solves this problem. Holding τ constant, the














As in Lemma 1, the regulator will set taxes such that τ(k,s) = De(e∗(k,s);s). From Lemma
1, we have
∂τ(·,s)
∂k < 0. At the investment stage, the ﬁrm’s objective function is




The subscript DT stands for discretionary taxes. The derivative of VDT evaluated at the



















































where the second equality follows from condition (8), and e(k∗,τ(k∗,s)) = e∗(s), the op-
timal state-s emissions. Note that r +
P
s∈S π(s)Ck(e∗
s,k∗) = 0 by equation (2). Since
∂τ(k∗,s)
∂k e(τ(k∗,s)) < 0, it follows that V 0
DT(k∗) < 0. Assuming that VDT is convex in invest-
ment k, this implies that the equilibrium investment by the ﬁrm is larger than the optimal
investment. Therefore, the discretionary tax scheme fails to achieve the social cost minimum
outcome characterized by (1) and (2). (We discuss the assumption of convexity of VDT fur-
ther in Appendix B.)
Proof of Proposition 3
A state-independent tax induces the ﬁrm to choose the same amount of emissions across
diﬀerent states. As long as the marginal cost function varies across states, the optimal emis-
sions will diﬀer across states. Hence, a tax scheme where the tax rate is uniform across states
26does not achieve the optimal outcome.
Proof of Lemma 2
Denote the optimal standard given investment k and state s ∈ S by q(k,s). It must satisfy
Ce(q(k,s),k) + De(q(k,s)) = 0.







for all k ≥ 0 and s ∈ S. Hence, the equilibrium discretionary standard level is strictly
decreasing in investment k.
Proof of Proposition 4
Given investment k and an emissions standard plan {(q(k,s))k≥0}s∈S, the ﬁrm chooses emis-
sions to minimize cost. From Lemma 2, we know that the optimal discretionary standard
level is decreasing in investment. At the investment stage, the ﬁrm solves
min
k≥0




The subscript DS stands for discretionary standards. The ﬁrst-order derivative is
V
0






















27where q(k∗,s) = e∗(s), the optimal state-s emissions. Note that r+
P
s∈S π(s)Ck(e∗(s),k∗) =
0 by equation (2). Since Ce(q(k∗,s),k∗) ·
∂q(k∗,s)
∂k > 0, it follows that V 0(k∗) > 0. Given the
convexity of VDS, this implies that the equilibrium investment by the ﬁrm is less than the
optimal investment. Therefore, the discretionary standard scheme fails to achieve the social
cost minimum outcome characterized by equations (1) and (2).
Proof of Proposition 5
With rules, the regulator sets a single tax or a single standard so that the ﬁrm faces the same
regulation no matter which state s ∈ S occurs. In the tax case, the ﬁrm facing emissions
tax τ will choose emissions level and investment given by the following equations:
r + Ck(e,k) = 0, (11)
Ce(e,k) + τ = 0.
Denote the solution by e(τ),k(τ). The regulator will choose the tax rate in order to minimize
social cost knowing the ﬁrm’s emissions and investment choices as a function of τ:
min


















In the case of standards, the ﬁrm will set emissions equal to the standard: e = q. The ﬁrm
will choose investment k(q) to satisfy
r + Ck(q,k(q)) = 0. (12)
28The regulator will choose the standard in order to minimize social cost knowing the ﬁrm’
emissions and investment choices as a function of standard:
min




The necessary and suﬃcient condition for solving this minimization problem is
rk










Noting that e = q, we therefore have the same equilibrium emissions and investment under
the tax rule and the standard rule.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let ∆ be the expected total costs in the equilibrium under discretionary standards minus
the expected total costs in the equilibrium under discretionary taxes. We want to show that
∆ > 0. First, for discretionary standards, we derive the equilibrium standards and emissions
as functions of investment. Then we derive the equilibrium investment under discretionary
standards. We follow the same steps for deriving equilibrium tax rates, emissions and in-
vestment under discretionary taxes. Then we show that ∆ > 0.
i) Discretionary standards
Given state s and investment k, the regulator sets the standard q(k,s) to solve
min
q≥0






Solving this problem, we obtain q(k,s) =
c(¯ e−ak)−f(s)
c+d . Given standards {(q(k,s))k≥0}s∈S, in







c(¯ e − ak − q(k,s))2
2
.
29The solution kDS is given by
k
DS =
−r(c + d)2 + acd(d¯ e + f)
a2cd2 .








c(¯ e − ak − e)2
2
+ τe.
The solution is given by e(k,τ) =
c(¯ e−ak)−τ
c . Hence, in state s, given investment k the
regulator sets the tax rate τ(k,s) to solve
min
τ≥0






The solution is given by τ(k,s) =
cd(¯ e−ak)+cf
c+d , and hence e(k,τ(k,s)) =
c(¯ e−ak)−f(s)
c+d (note that







c(¯ e − ak − e(k,τ(k,s)))2
2
+ τ(k,s)e(k,τ(k,s))].
The solution kDT is given by
k
DS =
−r(c + d)2 + 2ac2d¯ e + acd2¯ e + ac2f
a2cd(2c + d)
.
iii) Comparison of equilibrium costs



















































30In the last equation, the expression inside the square bracket is
−r +









We have kDT − kDS > 0 by Propositions 2 and 4. Hence, we have ∆ > 0. We conclude that
the expected total cost under taxes is less than the expected total cost under standards.
Proof of Proposition 7
Denote the equilibrium success probability under discretionary taxes by λDT. We will show
that λDT > λ∗.
Given technology (H or L) and tax rate τ, the ﬁrm sets emissions to minimize cost,
which occurs where marginal abatement cost equals the tax rate. Denote e(τ,H) and e(τ,L)
as the emissions level chosen by the ﬁrm given tax rate τ and technology H and L, respec-
tively.
Given state s and technology H or L, the regulator chooses a tax rate τ(s,H) or
τ(s,L)). Denote e∗(s,H) and e∗(s,L) as the optimal emissions in state (s,H) and (s,L),
respectively. The equilibrium discretionary tax rates are given by
τ(s,H) = De(e
∗(s,H);s), τ(s,L) = De(e
∗(s,L);s) for all s ∈ S.
Given {τ(s,H),τ(s,L)}s∈S, the ﬁrm chooses emissions {e∗(s,H),e∗(s,L)}s∈S.
At the investment stage, the ﬁrm’s objective function given the regulator’s optimal
discretionary tax rates is












We have V 00
DT(λ) = G00(λ) < 0, so VDT is strictly concave in λ. Hence, V 0
DT(λ) = 0 is the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the cost minimization. The ﬁrst-order derivative of








































Note that τ(s,L) < τ(s,H), and it follows from convexity of D(·;s) that τ(s,H)e∗(s,H) −



















where the equality in the last line of (13) follows from the ﬁrst order condition for optimality
shown in equation (7) in section 3. This result along with the concavity of VDT implies that
the equilibrium eﬀort λDT is larger than the optimal eﬀort λ∗. Therefore, the discretionary
tax scheme fails to achieve the social cost minimum outcome characterized by (5), (6) and
(7).
Proof of Proposition 9
Denote the equilibrium success probability under discretionary standards by λDS. We will
show that λDS < λ∗.
The ﬁrm facing emissions standard q will set emissions equal to q. Therefore, given
state s and technology H or L, the regulator chooses an emissions standard q(s,H) = e∗(s,H)
32and q(s,L) = e∗(s,L), where ∗(s,H) and e∗(s,L) are the optimal emissions in state (s,H) and













We have V 00
DS(λ) = G00(λ) < 0, so VDS is strictly concave in λ. Hence, V 0
DS(λ) = 0 is the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the cost minimization. The ﬁrst-order derivative of






























where the inequality in (14) follows from D(e∗(s,L);s) < D(e∗(s,H);s), and the equality in
(15) is from the ﬁrst order condition for optimality shown in equation (7) in section 3. This
implies that the equilibrium eﬀort λDS is smaller than the optimal eﬀort λ∗. Therefore, the
discretionary standard scheme fails to achieve the social cost minimum outcome character-
ized by (5), (6) and (7).
Appendix B: Convexity of the ﬁrm’s objective function
Here we discuss the conditions under which the ﬁrm’s objective, as a function of investment,
is convex under discretionary policies in the technology adoption model.
33Firm’s objective function under discretionary taxes
As in proposition 2, let e(k,τ) be the cost-minimizing choice of emissions by the ﬁrm given
investment k and tax rate τ. Let {(τ(k,s))k≥0}s∈S be the equilibrium discretionary tax rates
by the regulator. Given {(τ(k,s))k≥0}s∈S, the ﬁrm solves, in the investment stage,
min
k≥0




The ﬁrst-order derivative is
V
0
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which involves the third-order derivatives of C and D. Therefore, the sign of V 00
DT is indeter-
minate. However, if we assume that the absolute values of these third-order derivatives are
zero or small enough, then V 00
DT is positive and hence VDT is strictly convex.
Firm’s objective function under discretionary standards







Given {(q(k,s))k≥0}s∈S, in the investment stage the ﬁrm solves
min
k≥0




The ﬁrst-order derivative is
V
0






















































ek(Cee + Dee) + Ckk(Cee + Dee)2




(Cee + 2Dee)(CeeCkk − C2
ek) + CkkD2
ee
(Cee + Dee)2 + Ce
∂2q
∂k2
where CeeCkk − C2
ek ≥ 0 since C is convex, and hence the ﬁrst term is positive. The second
term includes the second-order derivative of q, which involves the third-order derivatives
of C and D. Therefore, the sign of V 00
DS is indeterminate. However, if we assume that the
absolute values of these third-order derivatives are zero or small enough, then V 00
DS is positive
and hence VDS is strictly convex.
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c=0.1, ebar=500, a=0.5, d=1, f=10. r=20
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Note: Slope fo the marginal damage cost function (d) is fixed at 1.
ebar=500, a=0.5, d=1, f=10, epsilon=10, r=20.
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Note: Slope fo the marginal abatement cost function (c) is fixed at 1.
ebar=500, a=0.5, c=1, f=10, epsilon=10, r=20.
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